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1 INTRODUCTION
Under the current European constitutional framework, reforming the national judi-
ciary – irrespective of the concrete political and policy context of the changes intro-
duced – is subject to substantial legal constraints which delimit quite significantly the
choices of national governments. There are Treaty provisions of constitutional character
which express clearly that the organization and operation of the national judiciary are not
purely domestic issues, but are central to the governance – ‘through law’ – of EU
integration in general as well as of individual common policies. There is also a long-
established and currently still expanding and deepening body of jurisprudence from the
EU Court of Justice which interferes directly with the regulation and the work of the
national judicial system. With increased political attention in the EU on illiberal devel-
opments in individual Member States, for instance in Hungary, institutional changes of
such nature and scale are expected to attract considerable legal and political scrutiny, and
raise the possibility of being added to the list of undesirable developments moni-
tored – and possibly sanctioned in the near future – under the EU’s rule of law
mechanism.
This article examines the current plan – at the time of publication supported by
a legislative measure adopted by parliament – for establishing a separate system of
administrative courts in Hungary. While there are multiple legal, political, organiza-
tional, and even historical reasons that may support this plan, its prospective
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implementation – especially in light of the political and constitutional developments
of recent years – raises equally numerous concerns about the future of the judicial
control of the Hungarian administration before independent courts. These concerns
also bear direct relevance from the perspective of the EU rules which govern the
operation of courts in the Member States, and raise worries about the judicial
enforcement of EU obligations in Hungary in the years to come. Our analysis is
structured as follows. First, we examine briefly the EU requirements which are
applicable to the organization and operation of national courts. We will pay special
attention to the recent developments before the EU Court of Justice where the
alleged weakening of national judicial frameworks was put under scrutiny based on
EU provisions. This is followed by an overview and analysis of the changes proposed
to the Hungarian judicial system. We conclude by examining the potential conflicts
that may arise between the applicable EU requirements and the perceived short-
comings of the novel system of administrative courts in Hungary.
2 EU LAW AND THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY
Since the full conception of the EU legal order as regulating obligations which are
directly enforceable before national courts and which prevail, as applied in indivi-
dual judicial cases, over conflicting provisions of national law, the organization and
operation of national judiciaries have become a central institutional, legal as well as
political issue for EU integration.1 National courts are expected to act as courts of
EU law2 in a decentralized institutional framework, which is held together, among
others, by the authority of the EU Court of Justice’s judgments and the prelimin-
ary ruling procedure.3 Their task is to oversee the national application of directly
applicable EU legislation and legislation transposed into national law, enforce
directly effective Treaty provisions mainly against national public authorities, and
provide remedies to nationals as well as individuals from other Member States
when wronged in violation of EU legal obligations.4 They also play a key role in
the operation and the legal supervision of horizontal collaborative frameworks of
administration in Europe which are governed by the principle of mutual recogni-
tion in the spirit of mutual trust.5 When carrying out these tasks, national courts
1 See European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context
(Anne Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds, Hart 1997).
2 See paras 41–42, Judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, C-50/00 P, EU:
C:2002:462; paras 100 and 101, Judgment of 3 Oct. 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v.
Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625.
3 See inter alia Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice. A Jurisprudence of Doubt?, in Philosophical
Foundations of EU Law 307–30 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds, OUP 2012); Akos Toth, The
Authority of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding Force and Legal Effects, YEL 1 (1984).
4 On the extensive jurisprudence on national remedies and procedural rules, see Michael Dougan,
National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Hart 2004).
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risk serious conflicts with significant political implications with their own govern-
ments, especially when they use their prerogatives of judicial review and granting
remedies against the State. Interventions by national governments in the national
judicial system may, thus, be perceived as attempts at taming the influence national
courts have gained from EU law and reducing the exposure of national policies and
regulation to EU obligations.
The position of national judiciaries described briefly above is recognized in the
current Treaty framework in Article 19 TEU.6 It provides, in the context of
regulating the judicial system of the Union, that the Member States are obliged
to provide sufficient remedies for ensuring effective legal protection ‘in the fields
covered by’7 EU law. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter, the
Charter) recognizes a number of fundamental legal requirements which regulate
certain aspects of the operation of national courts in the framework set out by
Article 19, such as the fundamental right to a fair trial and an effective judicial
remedy. Article 19 TEU has been interpreted by the Court of Justice in recent
high-profile rulings as a Treaty provision which gives concrete expression to the
‘value’ of the rule of law, as recognized in Article 2 TEU, and which, on that basis,
obliges national courts and tribunals to ensure the full application of EU law at
national level and provide judicial protection of the rights provided by the EU
legal order.8 The rule of law was then held to entrust national courts with the task
of exercising their judicial review competences effectively so that ‘compliance with
EU law’ is ensured.9 With this background, the Court declared that the Member
States bear the obligation of ensuring that national courts and tribunals ‘in the fields
covered by EU law’ provide effective judicial protection and remedies as required
by EU law.10
5 See inter alia Evelien Brouwer, Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights
in the EU and the Burden of Proof, Utrecht L. Rev. 135 (2013); Evelein Brouwer & Hemme Battjes, The
Dublin Regulation and Mutual Trust: Judicial Coherence in EU Asylum Law? Implementation of Case-Law of
the CJEU and the ECtHR by National Courts, Rev. Eur. Admin. L. 183 (2016).
6 EU law’s own right to effective judicial protection had provided traditionally the constitutional and
conceptual basis for interfering with the operation of courts in the Member States. See para. 39, Unión
de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, C-50/00 P. Recalled in para. 35, Judgment of 27 Feb. 2018,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, as inherent not only in Art. 47 of
the Charter but also in Art. 19 TEU.
7 This term has been interpreted as not constrained by the qualification given in Art. 51(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights which restricts the national impact of the Charter to instances when
the Member States implement EU law, para. 29, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
8 Para. 50, Judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-
216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586; para. 32, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16; para. 36,
Judgment of 6 Mar. 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158.
9 Para. 51, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU; para. 36,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
10 Para. 52, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU; para. 37,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
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The place of national courts in the EU legal and judicial order, as determined
by Article 19 TEU and the rule of law principle, was defined further in the so-
called Portuguese judges judgment. The Court held that the rule of law requires that
individual parties can ‘challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or
other national measure relating to the application to them of an EU act’.11
Repeating partially the earlier mentioned interpretative clause, it then ruled that
the rule of law provides the basis of the responsibility of national courts and
tribunals – alongside the Court of Justice – ‘for ensuring judicial review in the
EU legal order’ (as set out in Article 19 TEU).12 The Court also raised that the
general task regulated in the same TEU provision for the EU judiciary to ensure
‘that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’ is a
joint duty of national courts and tribunals as well as the Court of Justice, which
must act ‘in collaboration’.13 These obligations were given further constitutional
weight when the Court referred to the principle of loyalty under Article 4(3) TEU
which was interpreted as requiring the Member States ‘to ensure, in their respec-
tive territories the application of and respect for EU law’.14
The general principle of mutual trust among the Member States, and in
particular among ‘their courts and tribunals’,15 has also been relied upon in the
jurisprudence to define and anchor the European tasks and responsibilities of
national courts. The broader basis of that principle was found by the Court in
the legally relevant general political presumption that the Member States share
certain common values ‘with all the other Member States’, which was then
interpreted as requiring that national courts give effect to cross-border mutual
recognition when exercising their jurisdiction and, thus, expose national law to the
authority of the legal system of another Member State.16 In the Court’s view,
expressed in the so-called Polish judicial system case, participation in such horizontal
frameworks of cooperation comes, however, with certain obligations for the
national judiciary. It ruled that in order for mutual trust to prevail in the
EU and for EU common policies to remain operable in their cross-national
dimension17 the courts of each Member State are expected to adhere and give
effect to the EU’s common values and comply with the EU legal provisions which
11 Ibid., para. 31. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU
law is of the essence of the rule of law, ibid., para. 36.
12 Ibid., para. 32.
13 Ibid., para. 33.
14 Ibid., para. 34.
15 Ibid., para. 30.
16 Paras 35–37, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU; para. 34,
Achmea, C-284/16; para. 30, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
17 In the Court’s view, mutual trust and mutual recognition allow an area without internal borders to be
created and maintained.
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implement those values.18 On this basis, the Member States have to ensure that
(courts in) other Member States can regard them (and their courts), without having
the prerogative to carry out examinations to this effect, as complying with EU law
and the fundamental rights protected therein, including the right which impacts
national judiciaries perhaps the most extensively, the right to a fair trial.19 As stated
by the Court, a procedure launched under Article 7 TEU for the violation of the
EU’s common values, in particular the rule of law, can provide an important
indication of whether this is the case.20 In such instances, as a result of the systemic
or generalized deficiencies investigated in that procedure, the national judiciary
may be deemed unworthy of mutual trust by the other Member States and their
courts.21
In connection with the specific instrument of the European Arrest Warrant
(hereinafter, EAW),22 the operation of which is premised on mutual trust among
national authorities and courts, the Court made it clear that horizontal judicial
cooperation among the Member States necessary for the execution of EAWs issued
by another Member State, because of the weight of the prevailing principles of
mutual recognition and mutual trust can only be suspended in quite extreme
circumstances.23 This approach is perhaps more accommodating in regard to
concerns with the organization and the operation of national judiciaries than the
earlier mentioned general jurisprudence setting out the general responsibilities of
national courts under EU law. The difference is explained foremost by the
circumstance, as noted by the Court, that the EAW framework operates with
the strong presumption24 that national court decisions relating to EAWs are
attended by all the guarantees appropriate for judicial decisions, for example
those inherent in the principle of effective judicial protection and the fundamental
requirement of judicial independence.25 Nevertheless, there are limits as to what
the Member States may get away with under this presumption. The Court held
18 Paras 35–37, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU.
19 Ibid.
20 Paras 69–74, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU.
21 Ibid.
22 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L190/1.
23 Paras 40–42, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU. The
Court of another Member State, when addressing such claims, is obliged to collect objective, reliable,
specific and properly updated material and assess, on that basis, the operation of the system of justice of
the Member State concerned (i.e. the existence of systemic or generalized deficiencies) having regard
the relevant standards of EU law, ibid., paras 61–62. This must be followed by a specific and precise
assessment of whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for
believing that the individual concerned will be exposed to a ‘real risk’ of violation of its fundamental
rights, ibid., para. 68.
24 In other words: it follows from its central idea of mutual trust.
25 Ibid., paras 56 and 58.
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that they are expected to ensure that the national judicial system meets the
standards that allow cross-border mutual trust to prevail, and must avoid, in
particular, that the operation of national courts raises a ‘real risk’ of violation of
the fundamental rights regulated in the Charter, including the right to an inde-
pendent tribunal and a fair trial.26 Such ‘real risk’ of fundamental rights violation
(the risk of a flagrant denial of justice) may emerge from a situation when the
implementation of general judicial reform in a Member State undermines the
independence of national courts.27
Judicial independence has been specifically identified in the case law as a
legal benchmark against which the organization and operation of national
courts as courts of EU law can be measured. The Court in its ruling in the
Polish judicial system case held that in order for national courts to be able to
discharge their task of providing effective judicial protection under EU law it is
‘essential’ that their independence is maintained as required by Article 47 of the
Charter on the right to an effective remedy.28 It added, partly repeating the
earlier mentioned general principles, that from the perspective of the Union
and its legal order judicial independence and the general right to a fair trial bear
a value not only as fundamental rights, but also as guarantees that the rights
provided by EU law, as well as the common values of the Union including the
rule of law, will be protected effectively before national courts acting in the
review competences available under EU law for the control of national
measures.29 It also asserted that ensuring judicial independence in the
Member States is ‘essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation
system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267
TFEU’,30 which establishes a direct connection between the Court of Justice
and courts in the Member States.31
By way of establishing standards for judicial independence within this frame-
work, the Court explained in Polish judicial system that the independence of the
judiciary ‘is inherent in the task of adjudication’ and presupposes that courts
exercise their functions ‘wholly autonomously’ ‘without being subject to any
hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking
26 Ibid., paras 43–44 and 59. See paras 82 and 104, Judgment of 5 Apr. 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C-
404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198.
27 As raised in the domestic legal dispute addressed in the Polish judicial system case.
28 Para. 53, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU and para. 41,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
29 Paras 47–48, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU.
30 Para. 54, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU and para. 43,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
31 It is a ‘keystone of the EU judicial system’, Order of 16 Nov. 2018, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18,
EU:C:2018:910, para. 22.
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orders or instructions from any source whatsoever’.32 It warned that courts should
be allowed to operate in a way that they are ‘protected against external interven-
tions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to
influence their decisions’.33 Impartiality as an important attribute of judicial work
was also raised. It was defined as judges maintaining ‘an equal distance’ from the
parties and their respective interests, and as requiring that judges make their
assessments objectively and in the absence of ‘any interest in the outcome of the
proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law’.34
These standards are fairly broadly framed, and their application, as revealed by
their formulation, depends on the circumstances of the given case, or on the nature
and the impact of the measure introduced to interfere with the national judiciary.
This nature of judicial independence as a constitutional benchmark was revealed by
the Court in the Portuguese judges ruling. There, it decided that while the reduction
of the level of judicial salaries, which constitutes an aspect of judicial indepen-
dence, specifically in respect of certain judges is likely to violate that benchmark,
their general reduction within a broader legitimate policy framework (i.e. govern-
ment austerity) is unlikely to raise constitutional concerns, especially when it is
regulated as a temporary intervention.35 This latter assessment by the Court does
not mean, however, that general measures introduced, for example in the frame-
work of national judicial reform would automatically pass the legal test. As revealed
in the Polish supreme court orders, examined below, the Court of Justice may decide
to examine the perceived actual impact of the measure in question on judicial
independence in a specific court, rather than being preoccupied with the issue of
whether the measure was of general or individual nature.
Concerning institutional conditions within the national judiciary, the Court
made it clear in Polish judicial system that the regulation of the judicial system,
including the rules on the composition of courts, the appointment, length of
service, grounds for the abstention, rejection and dismissal36 of judges, as well as
the development of the general regulatory framework itself (i.e. its reform or
significant overhaul) must be able to ‘dispel any reasonable doubt’ as to the
32 Para. 63, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU and para. 44,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16. This autonomy was interpreted as requiring certain
guarantees ‘appropriate for protecting’ the judge, such as guarantees ‘against removal from office’, and
the provision of remuneration for judges which is commensurate with the importance of the functions
they carry out, para. 64, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU
and para. 45, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16.
33 Para. 63, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU.
34 Ibid., para. 65.
35 Paras 46–50, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16 (it was also limited and applied to public
sector employment in general).
36 The dismissal of judges must be regulated in express legislative provisions, para. 66, Minister for Justice
and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), C-216/18 PPU.
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‘imperviousness’ of courts to external factors and their ‘neutrality with respect to
the interests before’ them.37 As a specific institutional guarantee, it also emphasized
the importance of an adequately regulated disciplinary regime for the judicial
profession, which – in its interpretation – must include the guarantees necessary
for preventing ‘any risk of being used as a system of political control of the content
of judicial decisions’.38 The rules of such frameworks must define clearly the
disciplinary offences and the penalties actually applicable, the procedure before
the independent disciplinary body and the guarantees that ensure that the proce-
dure will be conducted in accordance with the right to fair trial and the rights of
the defence, as well as the possibility of bringing legal proceedings to challenge the
decisions of that disciplinary body.39
The Court continued its detailed standard-setting work in the ongoing case
against Poland where it ordered as interim relief the suspension of the new
measures introduced to change the composition of the supreme court. The case
bears particular relevance from the perspective of the planned Hungarian changes
as it demonstrates that the real risk of deviation from the relevant EU (constitu-
tional) requirements lies in the actual implementation of the new legal provisions,
in particular those which regulate the selection and employment of judicial
personnel (judges). The infringement procedure launched against Poland con-
cerned, on the one hand, the lowering of the retirement age of judges at the
supreme court and the application of that measure to judges already in office, and,
on the other, the power given to the president of the republic to extend, upon
individual application, the period of service for judges even though they reached
the newly introduced retirement age-limit. The exercise of the latter prerogative
was not regulated as bound by any criteria, and the decision of the president is not
open to be challenged in law. The new law also enabled increasing the number of
judges at the supreme court. In the Commission’s view these measures violated
Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. It argued that they together enabled
an interference with the independent operation of the Polish supreme court,
which interference is liable to hinder the proper functioning of the EU legal
order and may undermine the mutual trust between the Member States and
their courts.
In its interim order (Polish supreme court order I), the Court observed that as a
result of the application of the new measures a large number of judges, including
senior judicial officers, had already been forced to retire, and with the increasing of
the number of supreme court judges from 93 to 120, forty-four new judicial
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., para. 67.
39 Ibid.
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positions were opened.40 In its assessment, this situation had led to a deep and
immediate (‘profonde et immédiate’) recomposition of the Polish supreme court.41 It
asserted that in such a situation it is not guaranteed that the judgments delivered by
the supreme court, which exercises final jurisdiction in Poland and bears ‘l’autorité
de chose jugée’,42 would meet the guarantees enshrined in the right to an indepen-
dent tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter.43
In the 2018 December final order (Polish supreme court order II), the Grand
Chamber of the Court observed that it cannot be excluded that the Polish reform
has the effect of undermining the operation of the supreme court as an indepen-
dent court of EU law required to provide effective judicial protection for the rights
derived by individuals under EU law.44 It referred, in particular, to the potential
problems that may arise from the application of the new retirement age rule to
judges already in office as well as from the prerogative granted to the Polish
president to extend judicial appointments beyond that age-limit. In assessing the
impact of the Polish measure and the damage it may cause, the Court repeated the
findings of the interim order, in particular that the composition of the Polish
supreme court has already been altered quite significantly upon the application of
the new rules.45 It then declared that these changes pose a significant threat to the
independent operation of the supreme court as a court entrusted with the enforce-
ment of EU law, and may, thus, put the Union legal order, and with that the rights
individuals derive from EU law and the fundamental values of the Union, in
particular the rule of law, to jeopardy.46 It also added that from the perspective of
the enforcement of EU law in the Member States national higher courts bear
special relevance as any threat to their operation as courts of EU law may have an
impact on the operation of the entire national judicial system.47
As the interim order, the final order of the Grand Chamber placed emphasis
on the circumstance that the Polish supreme court, which exercises final
40 Para. 18, Order of 19 Oct. 2018, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18 R, EU:C:2018:852.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., para. 22.
43 Ibid., para. 19. The Court’s Nov. order, which dealt with the request for an expedited procedure,
indicated that the ‘actual composition and working conditions’ of a national supreme court are matters
of special constitutional and legal importance in the EU, para. 25, Order of 16 Nov. 2018, Commission
v. Poland, C-619/18 R. See also para. 15, Order of 26 Sept. 2018, Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, C-
522/18, EU:C:2018:786.
44 Paras 43–46, Order of 17 Dec. 2018, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18 R, EU:C:2018:102. It
recognized, nevertheless, that the question of whether the exercise of national competences in
developing and reforming the national judicial system is compatible with Art. 19 TEU and Art. 47
of the Charter requires a careful and thorough judicial assessment, ibid., para. 39.
45 Ibid., paras 62–63 (twenty-two judges were forced to retire and from the twelve judges applying for an
extension of service only five were given permission by the president).
46 Ibid., para. 68.
47 Ibid., para. 69.
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jurisdiction in the country, delivers judicial decisions under both national and EU
law, which have ‘l’autorité de chose jugée’ and which, as a result, may bring about
irreversible legal effects in regards the Union’s legal order.48 In this connection, it
also raised that the supreme court is entrusted with the task of monitoring and
controlling the lawfulness and the unity of judicial practice within the entire Polish
judicial system, in particular that concerning the interpretation of national measures
enacted for the national implementation of EU obligations.49 It was also of
relevance that the decisions of the supreme court, including those which clarify
legal interpretation as well as the applicability of national measures in cases with an
EU law dimension, bind lower courts in law. The Court of Justice asserted in this
regard that it is this legal authority of supreme court decisions which may convince
the other Member States and their courts that, based on concerns about the
independence of the supreme court, they can no longer trust the Polish judicial
system and that the rule of law will be upheld in that country.50 This possibility
that mutual trust and mutual recognition, as fundamental EU requirements, may
no longer be presumed vis-à-vis Poland and the Polish judicial system led the Court
to conclude that the Polish reforms may seriously undermine the orderly function-
ing (‘fonctionnement régulier’) of the Union legal order, especially in the domain of
cooperation in civil and criminal matters.51
3 ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE
COURTS IN HUNGARY
After the victory in the elections of 2018, the Hungarian government decided to
revisit quite swiftly its earlier plan52 of restructuring the national system of admin-
istrative justice, in particular by taking jurisdiction in administrative cases away
from the current uniformly administered system of ordinary courts and bestowing
it upon a newly established, separately instituted and administered system of
administrative courts. Politically, this was not an unexpected move as judicial
review remains almost the only practical opportunity to oppose and control an
executive which has total control over parliament and which seems to consider
that nearly every social, economic, cultural etc. issue ought to be available for
48 Ibid., para. 71.
49 Ibid., para. 72.
50 Ibid., paras 72–73.
51 Ibid., paras 74–75. More specifically, it held that the threat for the EU legal order follows from other
Member States declining the recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions issues by Polish
courts, ibid., para. 76. In support of this assertion, it referred specifically to its earlier Polish judicial
system ruling, ibid., para. 77.
52 See inter alia Ildikó Bartha, (Jog)állami bíróság? A közigazgatási bíráskodás magyarországi reformja 2016-ban,
Jogtudományi Közlöny 575 (2016).
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political decision-making unshielded by independent institutions, or by a broader
notion of constitutionalism.53 Despite the immediate and rather significant political
gains that may arise from a judicial reform of such scale and nature, the govern-
ment proceeded perhaps more carefully than in the earlier instances of post-2010
institutional overhauls. Its slight hesitation can be explained, in part, by the
intensifying pressure arising from the EU under its rule of law mechanism, and
the perceivable risks posed by the changes for judicial independence54 and the rule
of law itself, which can both be closely monitored under common European
requirements. Nonetheless, the unfolding of the Polish judicial system saga before
the Court of Justice in the summer and autumn of 2018 does not seem to have
made an impact on the Hungarian government’s plans.55
As common with legal reform in post-1989, and more so in post-2010
Hungary, justification for setting up a separate system of administrative courts
was found in historical – pre-1945 – precedent.56 While the narrative of some
kind of historical continuity may sound comforting to some, neither the political,
constitutional, social, economic etc. context, nor the institutional design of admin-
istrative courts in the former Kingdom of Hungary seem suitable to justify such a
fundamental overhaul of the judicial system in the political and economic envir-
onment of contemporary Hungary. The argument of experimenting with another,
possibly more efficient model for administering the judiciary57 is perhaps more
convincing, and being part of a smaller system of judicial administration than the
current quite large unified framework may hold some benefits for the future
administrative courts. Nonetheless, the proposed new framework for administering
administrative courts does not, at this point, appear much less complex, and the
prospect of administrative courts being subjected to the administrative, budgetary
and personnel prerogatives of the minister for justice is unlikely to dissolve the
already existing concerns about judicial independence in Hungary. The claims that
administrative adjudication is a special, constitutionally exposed branch of the
judiciary, which therefore needs to be separated from ordinary courts, and that it
may be dispensed better and more effectively by expert judges, possibly with
considerable experience in (specialized areas of) public administration, again seem
53 See Kriszta Kovács & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Post-Communist Administrative Law Revolutions, in
Comparative Administrative Law 119–38 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds, Elgar 2017).
54 See Judgment of 6 Nov. 2012, Commission v. Hungary, C-286/12, EU:C:2012:687 and the earlier
analysed Polish cases.
55 It is difficult to say whether the adoption of the act by Parliament in late 2018 was rushed in order to
pre-empt potential external challenges. The process followed its own timetable set out early summer
2018. It remains a fact, however, that the promise to wait with the adoption of the legislation for the
opinion of the Venice Commission was not kept.
56 For a short history of administrative courts in Hungary, see point 3.1.
57 On the different models of judicial administration in post-1989 Hungary, see Herbert Küpper,
Magyarország átalakuló közigazgatási bíráskodása, MTA Law Working Papers 2014/59.
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to refer to valid considerations. However, without sufficient guarantees, especially
those that are able to prevent the exposure of the administration as well as the new
administrative court system to direct political preferences, their implementation
holds considerable risks for the independence of the judiciary.
3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The history of the judicial review of the administration commenced in Hungary in
1883 when the Financial Administrative Court was set up. This was followed by
the creation of the Royal Administrative Court in 1896, which was a specialized
court with general jurisdiction to hear administrative cases. The system remained
in place until 1949 when judicial review was abolished, only to be reinstated as a
very restricted, only formally available institution within the communist legal
system. In this period, legal redress against administrative action was provided, as
a norm, in the form of appeals within the administration. In 1989, as a cornerstone
of the new democratic state based on the rule of law the amendment of the
Constitution introduced the constitutional basis of administrative justice in post-
communist Hungary by declaring the prerogative of Hungarian courts to review
the legality of administrative decisions and the right of individuals to seek legal
redress for the violation of their rights by the administration.58 An early, 1990
decision of the newly set up Constitutional Court confirmed that the judicial
review of administrative action had become a fundamental principle of the
Hungarian legal order.59
The post-1989 constitutional framework did not provide for the establishment
of a separate system of administrative courts. Jurisdiction for judicial review was
exercised by ordinary courts within the uniformly administered judicial system.
This was slightly changed in 2011 when first instance final jurisdiction in judicial
review was given to the newly set up administrative and labour courts, which
were, nonetheless, part of the ordinary judicial system. Their judgments can be
challenged in extraordinary review procedures before the administrative and labour
division of the Kúria (the Hungarian supreme court). In the post-1989, as well as in
the post-2010 Hungarian constitutional system, courts are declared to enjoy full
legal independence. The appointment of judges and their removal from office can
be ordered by the president of the republic only, their rights, obligations and
responsibility are regulated in an act of parliament, and the administration of the
judicial system falls within the competence of the National Office for the Judiciary.
The operation of the National Office is supervised by the National Judicial
58 Act 1989:XXXI, ss 50(2) and 57(5).
59 Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/1990, ABH 1990/145.
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Council, which is a body of elected representatives of judges. The budget of the
National office is regulated separately within the annual government budget.60
The reshaping of the Hungarian judicial system by setting up a system of
administrative courts separate from ordinary civil and criminal courts has become
part of the politico-constitutional agenda of the post-2010 political regime only
recently. After a failed first attempt in 2016, its constitutional basis was created in
2018 when the seventh modification of the 2011 Fundamental Law was adopted
by the new parliament. The Fundamental Law now holds that the Hungarian
judicial system consists of ordinary and administrative courts. According to Article
25(3), the jurisdiction of the latter covers ‘administrative adjudication’, and the top
forum within the separate system of administrative courts is the Supreme
Administrative Court (Közigazgatási Felsőbíróság). In autumn 2018, a legislative
bill for establishing the separate system of administrative courts and a bill regulating
transitional institutional arrangements in the judicial system were put before
parliament.61 The ministerial reasoning for the first bill made a marked effort to
indicate that the new system will comply with international and European stan-
dards, especially the relevant recommendations of the Venice Commission.62 The
two acts63 were adopted on 12 December 2018. Act 2018:CXXX on adminis-
trative courts will enter into force and the new courts will commence their
operation on 1 January 2020.
3.2 THE PROPOSED CHANGES
According to the new legislative provisions, future administrative courts will have
jurisdiction to hear cases in administrative adjudication (basically, judicial review).
General first instance jurisdiction was given to local administrative courts and
review jurisdiction will be exercised by the Supreme Administrative Court. The
Supreme Administrative Court will also hear the cases referred to it concerning the
legality of local government legislation. The main remedies to be served by
administrative courts include the annulment (quashing), the denying of the legal
force, and the changing (reformation) of unlawful administrative decisions. If
60 In the past few years, the relationship between the National Office and the National Judicial Council
became rather tense as the Judicial Council openly criticized the president of the Judicial Office for
overstepping the legal limits of her powers. Over the autumn of 2018, the operation and the
legitimacy of the Judicial Council were both put to jeopardy by a failed attempt to replace its
previously retired members.
61 Bills T/3353 and T/3354.
62 See the Rule of Law Checklist adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session
(Venice, 11–12 Mar. 2016), CDL-AD(2016)007.
63 Act 2018:CXXX on administrative courts and Act 2018:CXXXI on transitional measures.
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necessary, the administrative authority can be ordered to conduct a new procedure
in the matter affected.
There will be eight first instance administrative courts. The Supreme
Administrative Court will be set up outside of Budapest, in the town of
Esztergom. The choice of this location is supposed to indicate the separateness of
the jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Administrative Court from that of the
Kúria, which will remain in Budapest. First instance courts will hear cases in
judicial chambers of three judges or before the individual judge. The Supreme
Administrative Court will, as a general rule, sit in judicial chambers of three judges
headed by the chamber-head judge. It will have judicial review chambers and a
chamber for the review of local government legislation. For operational transpar-
ency, members of the judicial chambers will be named in the annually published
order of assigning cases to individual judges.64 Supreme Administrative Court will
have three divisions: a general, a fundamental rights and a financial division. As in
the current framework, divisions will function primarily as professional forums for
discussing matters relating to developments in the jurisprudence in a specific
administrative law area, or any other professional issue affecting judicial practice.
The body for the professional self-governance of administrative judges will be
the National Council for Administrative Judges (hereinafter, National Council). It
will have eleven members; these are the president of the Supreme Administrative
Court, the representative of each local administrative court (eight), and the two
representatives of the Supreme Administrative Court. Its task will include mon-
itoring the general situation of administrative courts, issuing opinions on legislative
proposals affecting the administrative justice system, proposing such legislation
before the minister for justice, issuing an opinion on the planned budget of the
administrative justice system, exercising a right of consent regarding changes
implemented to the annual budget, and issuing an opinion on the plans and the
programme for the training of judicial personnel. The National Council will also
have powers in the judicial appointment process, which we will discuss in detail
below. It will also decide on forwarding to the minister the applications for senior
judicial officer positions (judicial positions with senior administrative tasks), assess
such applications, and propose the removal of appointed judicial officers. These
powers will be exercised in practice by its Personnel Committee. The Committee
will consist of the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, four elected
members of the National Council, and leading academics or legal practitioners
64 The order, which is a central guarantee of judicial independence and the fundamental right to judge, is
issued by the president of the given administrative court. It must enable ascertaining, in advance and
without any doubt, which chamber in what composition will hear the given administrative case. It’s
prepared on the basis of a set of more-or-less objective criteria, such as workload or the specialization
of individual judges.
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promoted (one each) by the justice committee of parliament, the chief prosecutor,
the minister responsible for administration, and by the president of the Hungarian
Bar Association.
The new legal arrangements give the task of the general administration of the
new administrative court system to the minister for justice.65 This means that
administrative courts will leave the current unified system of administration man-
aged by the National Office of the Judiciary. The minister will exercise the
operative powers (powers of implementation) over the budget of the administra-
tive court system, it will determine, with the participation of the president of the
Supreme Administrative Court, the number of judges and judicial staff to be
employed, and it will decide on the assignment of judges to courts within the
system, as well as their transfer and secondment to a different court. The minister
will decide also on the appointment of senior judicial officers at local administrative
courts, supervise their work in the administration of their court, and it will exercise
employer’s rights over the presidents of local administrative courts. Its powers in
the judicial appointment process will be discussed in detail below.
The involvement of the minister of justice in judicial administration is a
controversial development, which in the current state of constitutionalism in
Hungary should be closely followed. This is the case, in particular, at local
administrative court level where matters of administration and operation fall
under the considerable and direct influence of the minister, which exercises
appointment powers in connection with senior judicial officer positions, including
the presidents of these courts. The new legal provisions barely restrict its discretion,
and with no legal recourse available against its decisions the guarantees for the
independence of the future administrative judiciary, which is entrusted in the
constitution with the task of controlling the executive, seem insufficient. General
ministerial responsibility, which is the only express legal guarantee provided, is
rather distantly positioned from the individual decisions taken, and may only be
formal when the government has dominant control over parliament.
The Supreme Administrative Court’s position will be somewhat different
from that of local administrative courts as its president will be appointed by
parliament with two-thirds of its members for nine years.66 The appointment
proposal will be made by the president of the republic, and the candidate must
be selected from judges currently serving in the judicial system.67 Only parliament
65 See Ch. VIII, Act 2018:CXXX. The day-to-day administration will be the task of the presidents, vice-
presidents and the registrars of the new courts. The different bodies and forums of professional self-
governance (the National Council, the judicial councils of local administrative courts, the judicial
council of the Supreme Administrative Court) will not be provided supervision and controlling
powers over matters relating to judicial administration.
66 Fundamental Law, Art. 26(3).
67 Ibid.
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can order the removal of the president of the Supreme Administrative Court from
office. Its powers of administration will include, among others, exercising employ-
er’s rights over judges and trainee judges at the Supreme Administrative Court,
determining the order of assigning cases to individual judges, proposing legislation
before the minister of justice concerning the administrative justice system and
issuing opinions on legislative proposals on the same matter, participating upon
invitation in the committees of parliament when they discuss such legislative
proposals, and evaluating annually the long-term tasks of judicial administration
and the programme developed for their implementation, and participating in the
implementation of that programme.
The new legislative framework regulates several formal components of inde-
pendence for the new administrative courts. The personal independence of judges,
as currently, will rest on Article 26(1) of the Fundamental Law. That provision
recognizes judicial independence as a constitutional principle, and excludes speci-
fically that judges are instructed in their judicial function. It also regulates the main
principles concerning their removal from office. Furthermore, despite the floating
of ideas of establishing a separate professional stream for administrative judges more
closely modelled on that of civil servants, judges at the administrative courts will
remain members of the uniform judicial profession.68 The financial independence
of administrative courts is going to be guaranteed by the separate budgetary chapter
included in the annual state budget. The proposal for that chapter will be prepared
by the minister for justice on the basis of the detailed proposal submitted by the
president of the Supreme Administrative Court. The minister’s final proposal will
have to be sent to the president of the Supreme Administrative Court and the
National Council for Administrative Judges for an opinion, and, after obtaining
those opinions, it will need to be forwarded to parliament without any modifica-
tion. The president of the Supreme Administrative Court, and in case it does not
affect the Supreme Administrative Court, of the National Council has a right of
consent over major modifications of the adopted budget.
The most important, and from the perspective of the applicable EU require-
ments perhaps most controversial provisions of the 2018 act concern the filling of
judicial positions at the new courts.69 Their application, especially in the months
leading up to the setting up of the new administrative court system in 2020, can
have significant implications for the composition of administrative courts, in
particular that of the Supreme Administrative Court. We saw in the case of the
Polish changes that the composition of national higher courts can play a central
role in the assessment of whether the national judicial system – as a whole – meets
68 S. 64, Act 2018:CXXX.
69 Ss 67–72, Act 2018:CXXX.
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fundamental EU standards and can be said to pose no threat to the integrity of the
EU legal order. The system of judicial appointments to the administrative court
system has a number of components. First, as mentioned earlier, the number of
judges who will serve at the administrative courts is not determined by legislation,
but will be established – later in 2019 – by the minister and the president of the
Supreme Administrative Court. Second, judges currently in office have been given
the opportunity of requesting their transfer to the new administrative court system
without being required to submit a formal application for a new judicial appoint-
ment. Their transfer will take place by virtue of the legislative provisions them-
selves – and not subject to a discretionary decision – on 1 January 2020.70 Third,
new judicial appointments will be made in an appointment framework which
provides far-reaching discretionary powers for the minister of justice.
In the appointment framework for new judicial appointments, the call for
applications will be published by the minister for justice.71 Applications will have to
be submitted to the president of the administrative court where the position is
advertised. Applicants will be interviewed by the personnel committee of that court,
the opinion of which will be forwarded to the Personnel Committee of the National
Council. The applications will be evaluated by the Personnel Committee, which can
use 80% of the points to be given to evaluate the professional competences of the
applicant and 20% to evaluate the applicant’s personal suitability (e.g. dedication,
personal preparedness). After interviewing the candidates, the Personnel Committee
will establish a ranking of candidates and forward the best applications in that ranking
(those which surpassed 85% of the highest score) to the minister of justice. The
minister will make the final appointment decision. In making that decision, it will
not be bound by the raking of the Personnel Committee. Modifications to the
Personnel Committee’s ranking must, however, be supported by adequate reasons.
The minister also decides on the place of service of the appointed judge.
According to the ministerial reasoning, this regulation of the appointment process
will guarantee a balanced distribution of powers and responsibilities among the
participating institutional actors, namely the professional bodies of the judiciary and
the minister. It asserted, in particular, that the minister’s use of its discretion will be
sufficiently constrained by its obligation to make the judicial appointment from the
pool of candidates forwarded by the Personnel Committee (the ranking), the duty to
provide reasons for abandoning the raking established by the Personnel Committee,
70 S. 2, Act 2018:CXXXI.
71 The call for applications for trainee judge positions will also be published by the minister of justice.
Applicants will be interviewed and evaluated by the personnel committee of the administrative court
in question and the president of that court will make a proposal to the minister on that basis, who will
then appoint the person proposed. It seems, therefore, that the presidents of administrative courts will
play a decisive role in admitting individuals to the judicial profession. Their powers are unfortunately
not subject to any visible limitations or controls.
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and also by the rule which permits the minister to abandon an ongoing appointment
process only when the National Council makes an express proposal to that effect. The
ministerial reasoning concluded that the appointment powers of the minister are, thus,
subject to strict institutional and procedural controls, and it is excluded that considera-
tions extraneous to the process influence judicial appointments.72 However, it is
difficult to share the optimism of the government’s position. Even though the choices
open to the minister have been delimited by these legislative provisions, they are alone
insufficient to prevent the abuse of ministerial appointment powers, especially when
that involves appointing a politically preferred candidate. As currently regulated, the
minister’s appointment decisions, unless it follows the decision of the Personnel
Committee, are not subject to objective criteria (as is the case with the choices
made by the Personnel Committee) against which their legality (rationality) could
be measured. The failure to introduce such objective criteria, which the minister
would have to take into consideration, also makes the obligation to give reasons for
changes made in the Personnel Committee’s ranking an empty, only formally binding
guarantee.
The potential concerns about the integrity of the process for new judicial
appointments in the new administrative court system must also be assessed in light
of the openly declared aim of the government to fill judicial positions with candidates
with a recognizable civil service or similar ‘administrative law’ background.73 Even
though such personnel policy priority seems justifiable in general, and its realization
may have benefits in terms of the professional competence of administrative judges, its
implementation in the appointment process as regulated currently may exacerbate
further the risk of abuse in the exercise of the minister’s discretionary powers. There is
a possibility that experience in central or other administration will be indicated in the
statement of reasons given by the minister when giving preference to a candidate
ranked lower by the Personnel Committee, which can be used to justify, without
revealing the true reasons, the appointment of a politically trustworthy candidate. The
rationale as well as the limits exposed in the ministerial reasoning of the new act for
this particular personnel policy aim are not particularly reassuring. It merely referred to
the vague notion of the ‘public interest’ in support of filling the judicial profession with
former civil servants or similar, and made the rather ambiguous declaration that with
its implementation judicial decision-making will be connected more directly to ‘real
life’ and will be influenced more intensively by the consideration ‘practicability’. None
of the latter sound too convincing, or particularly relevant.
72 Judicial appointments in Hungary have a history of being influenced by non-merit considerations, and
even by nepotism, see Attila Badó, Political, Merit-Based and Nepotistic Elements in the Selection of
Hungarian Judges. A Possible Way of Creating Judicial Loyalty in East Central Europe, International
Journal of the Legal Profession 259 (2016).
73 See e.g. ss 65–66, Act 2018:CXXX.
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4 ASSESSMENT
On a general level, the legislative foundation introduced for the new, separate
system of administrative courts in Hungary seems adequately prepared. It regulates
an institutional and substantive legal framework which can be expected to secure
the delivery of the proposed outcome of a more effective, professionally better
qualified administrative judiciary. This is an outcome which is in harmony with
EU law’s central requirement that the Member States ensure the effective judicial
enforcement of EU obligations/the effective judicial protection of rights derived
from EU law. However, there are number of details in the new legislative frame-
work, which, especially when given effect in practice, may – individually, or as an
effect of their joint application – risk violating the applicable requirements of EU
law, in particular those developed in recent jurisprudence concerning national
judiciaries. Necessarily, the extent of this risk may only be fully assessed when
the new courts are set up and begin their operation in 2020, and, even then, the
assessment must be carefully performed as EU law’s requirements have not been
applied to such extensive modifications of the national judicial system.
Nevertheless, it remains a fact that altering the system of administrative courts in
Hungary is an extremely sensitive issue under Article 19 TEU and the related
general principles and ‘values’, in particular, because these courts have served since
EU accession as the main forum for the enforcement of EU law, often in high-
profile litigation affecting core government policies and interests. They have also
been responsible for the majority of preliminary references made by Hungarian
courts to the EU Court of Justice requesting the interpretation of EU legal
provisions.
In light of the approach followed by the Court of Justice in its scrutiny of the
recent changes introduced in the Polish judicial system, the powers granted to the
minister of justice in administering the new system of administrative courts and the
(lack of sufficient) constraints imposed on its discretion are the most sensitive
components of the Hungarian reform. The minister’s use of its powers may result
in a composition of administrative courts, which may then be evaluated as under-
mining the independence of the Hungarian administrative judiciary in a manner
which raises doubts about whether the judicial enforcement of EU law in Hungary
can still be trusted and whether Hungarian administrative courts, as autonomous
judicial bodies worthy of mutual trust, meet the relevant EU values and constitu-
tional principles. As raised earlier, the minister’s discretion in the appointment
process for new judicial positions, contrary to what the ministerial reasoning of the
new act claims, has not been subjected to sufficient guarantees and safeguards,
which could prevent meaningfully potential abuses of its appointment powers.
While the automatic transfer (upon their request) of currently serving judges may
WHITHER ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN HUNGARY 19
be able to counterbalance the undesirable impact the intake of new judges may
cause on the composition and operation of the new administrative courts, the
prerogative of the minister to determine the number of judges serving in the new
system, and, thereby, carefully adjusting the ratio of ‘old’ and new judges, may
cancel out any such effects.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear whether the legal position emerging from
the Polish cases can be used to halt, or at least influence the unfolding of the
changes in the Hungarian judicial system. First, the Hungarian reform only affects
administrative courts. While the administrative judiciary plays a significant role in
the enforcement of EU law in Hungary, it is unlikely that the conclusion – similar
to that drawn in the Polish supreme court orders – can be made that changes in that
specific judicial domain undermine the status of the entire Hungarian judicial
system under Article 19 TEU and the Union ‘value’ of the rule of law.
Furthermore, there is also the issue that the conclusion reached in the Polish
supreme court orders is legally rather ambitious. It asserts that the personnel changes
being carried out at supreme court level have the undisputable effect of under-
mining the trustworthiness under EU law of any court within the Polish judicial
system. This is a highly contentious finding and has not been sufficiently explored
in the Court’s orders. T In the circumstances of the Hungarian changes, there is no
guarantee that this legal assessment can be reproduced with the same content and
with the same legal force. Third, it is also of importance that the Court’s position
in the Polish cases relied explicitly on the risks posed for judicial cooperation in
criminal and civil matters, as well as for the underlying principles of mutual trust
and mutual recognition, which bear less relevance in the case of administrative
courts. Fourth, the Hungarian reform is quite significantly different from the Polish
changes. The Hungarian measure will set up a new system of courts, the personal
composition of which may not at all be measured against a previously existing
arrangement. Finally, the conclusion drawn by the Court concerning judicial
independence from the facts it managed to gather from the Polish changes seems
rather tentative in its substance, therefore, the arrival of new judges and the
departure of some of the old judges in a larger judicial apparatus, as premised by
the Hungarian act, may not warrant a finding that judicial independence has been
compromised. In the circumstances of the Hungarian reform, instead of changes
made to the composition of courts, the lack of sufficient guarantees and safeguards
constraining the powers of the minister may serve as a more appropriate ground for
assessing whether the new administrative courts can be trusted as courts of
European Union law.
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4.1 ADDENDUM 1
The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission delivered its opinion on the changes
in March 2019.74 While it accepted that establishing a separate administrative court
system, which is a sovereign decision by a State, cannot be objected per se, it raised
that the ‘modalities’ of implementing that choice, having regard to their accumu-
lated effect, suffer from certain insufficiencies. It pointed out, in particular, that the
cumulation of organizational and management powers in the hands of a few actors,
especially of the minister for justice holds considerable risks and there are insuffi-
cient checks and balances provisions in place to ensure the reduction of those risks.
As specific recommendations, the opinion suggested that Hungary provides criteria
for when the minister decides to change the ranking of candidates for judicial
appointments, ties that decision to a consent from the National Council, allows for
a judicial remedy for candidates again the minister’s decision, and introduces
stricter and more precise legal supervision of the conditions for when the minister
declares the appointment procedure unsuccessful. It also recommended introdu-
cing guarantees in the appointment process for senior judicial officers as well as
adding professional quality requirements in the appointment of the president of the
Supreme Administrative Court. The opinion made it clear that the powers of the
president of the Supreme Administrative Court needs to be put under control,
either professional control by representatives of administrative judges, or legal
control by means of providing legal remedies against certain biding decisions. As
positive aspects of the reform, the Venice Commission noted that it is ensured in
legislation that current administrative judges can continue their office in the new
court system, and that, in general, broadening the recruitment base for adminis-
trative judges may have benefits.
The Hungarian government reacted by adopting Act 2019:XXIV on the
further guarantees of the independence of administrative courts. It modified the
appointment conditions for the president of the Supreme Administrative Court
(including the condition of a minimum five year relevant experience), provided for
a legal remedy against decisions of the president which an administrative judge
believes to jeopardize his/her judicial independence (subject to an admissibility
condition of direct concern), and re-regulated the involvement of the minister for
justice in the judicial appointment process. In regard the latter, the new provisions
hold that a change in the ranking of candidates – on grounds of the minister’s
assessment of the candidate’s professional preparedness and communications, deci-
sion-making and analytical skills – must be supported with written reasons by the
74 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on the law on administrative courts
(Hungary), No. 943/2018, 19 Mar. 2019, CDL-AD(2019)004.
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minister, which should cover the reasons for ordering the hearing of the candidate
as well as the reasons for the minister’s choice and decision. The minister’s
appointment decision can be challenged on grounds that the appointed candidate
does not fulfil the conditions for judicial appointments or the conditions specified
in the call for applications, or that the minister failed to discharge its obligation to
give reasons or the reasons given do not meet the earlier mentioned criteria. The
appointment process for senior judicial officers was also reconsidered. While the
modifications did address some of the criticisms raised by the Venice Commission,
it would be difficult to argue that risks that may arise from the cumulative effect of
the provisions regulating the new system, especially when implemented in the
current political setting in Hungary, could be dismissed. The performance of the
new courts in judicial review, either under national or under European law, will
tell shortly whether the executive in Hungary has managed to break the judicial
branch.
4.2 ADDENDUM 2
On 30 May 2019, after the European elections on the previous Sunday, the
government announced that the introduction of the new administrative court
system will be delayed for an indefinite period of time. The government reasoned
its decision by pointing out that the proposed system is subjective intensive debates
in Europe and at home, and the delay is an indication of its commitment to
guaranteeing judicial independence.
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